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&a;a;lt;strong&a;a;gt;2.1 of the in and design of gover in general.&a;a;lt;/strong&a;a;gt;
&a;a;lt;strong&a;a;gt;with cise remarks on the english stitution&a;a;lt;/strong&a;a;gt;
so writers have so founded society with gover, as to leave little or no distiween the whereas they are not only different, but have different ins.
society is produced by our wants, and gover by our wiess; the forr protes our positively by uniting our affes, the latter ively by restraining our vices.the one ences inturse, the other creates distins.
the first a patron, the last a punisher.
society in every state is a blessing, but gover even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the sa series by a gover, which we ght expe a try without gover, our calaty is heightened by refleg that we furnish the ans by which we suffer.
gover, like dress, is the badge of lost ihe palaces of kings are built on the ruins of the bowers of paradise.for were the iulses of sce clear, unifor and irresistibly obeyed, n would need no other lawgiver; but that not being the case, he finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish ans for the prote of the rest; and this he is io do by the sa prudence whi every other case advises hiout of two evils to choose the least.wherefore, security being the true design and end of gover, it unanswerably follows, that whatever form thereof appears st likely to e to us, with the least expense and greatest be, is preferable to all others.
in order to gain a clear and just idea of the design and end of gover, let us suppose a sll nuer of persoled in so sequestered part of the earth, ued with the rest, they will then represent the first peopling of any try, or of the world.
in this state of natural liberty, society will be their first thought.
a thousand tives will excite thethereto, the strength of one n is so unequal to his wants, and his nd so unfitted for perpetual solitude, that he is soon obliged to seek assistand relief of another, who in his turn requires the sa.four or five united would be able to raise a tolerable dwelling in the dst of a wilder&a;a;lt;s&a;a;gt;9９lib.&a;a;lt;/s&a;a;gt;ness, but one n ght labour out of the on period of life without aplishing any thing; when he had felled his tier huld not reve it,it after it was reved; hunger in the an ti would urge hifrohis work, and every different want call hia different way.disease, nay even sfortune would be death, for though her ght be rtal, yet either would disable hifroliving, and reduce hito a state in which he ght rather be said to perish than to die.
thus y, like a gravitating power, would soon forour newly arrived egrants into society, the reciprocal blessings of which, would supersede, and rehe obligations of law and gover unnecessary while they reined perfectly just to each other; but as nothing but heaven is irego vice, it will unavoidably happen, that in proportion as they surunt the first difficulties of egration, which bound thetogether in a on cause, they will begin to relax in their duty and attat to each other; and this ressness will point out the y of establishing so forof govero supply the defeoral virtue.
so veree will afford thea state-house, uhe branches of which, the whole ay assele to deliberate on public tters.
it is re than probable that their first laws will have the title only ulations, and be enforced by no other penalty than public disestee
in this first parliant every n, by natural right, will have a seat.
but as the y increases, the publis will increase likewise, and the dista which the ers y be separated, will re too inve for all of theto et on every oasion as at first, when their nuer was sll, their habitations near, and the publis few and trifling.
this will point out the venience of their senting to leave the legislative part to be naged by a seleuer chosen frothe whole body, who are supposed to have the sa s at stake which those oihe and who will a the sa nner as the whole body would act, were they present.
if the y tinues increasing, it will bee necessary to augnt the nuer of the representatives, and that the i of every part of the ay be atteo, it will be fouo divide the whole into ve parts, each part sending its proper nuer; and that the elected ght never forto theelves an i separate frothe electors, prudence will point out the propriety of haviions often; because as the elected ght by that aurn and x again with the general body of the electors in a few nths, their fidelity to the public will be secured by the prudent refle of not king a rod for theelves.and as this frequent interge will establish a on i with every part of the unity, they will tually and naturally support each other, and on this (not on the unaning na of king) depends the strength of gover, and the happiness of the governed.
here then is the in and rise of gover; naly, a de rendered necessary by the inability of ral virtue to govern the world; here too is the design and end of gover, viz.freedoand security.
and however our eyes y be dazzled with show, or our ears deceived by sound; however prejudice your wills, or i darken our uanding, the sile voice of nature and of reason will say, it is right.
i drawidea of the forof gover froa principle in nature, whio artoverturn, viz.that the re sile any thing is, the less liable it is to be disordered; and the easier repaired when disordered; and with this xiin view, i offer a few rerks on the so ch boasted stitution of england.that it was noble for the dark and slavish tis in which it was erected, is granted.
when the world was overrun with tyranny the least reve therefrowas a glorious rescue.but that it is ierfect, subject to vulsions, and incapablewhat it see to prose, is easily denstrated.
absolute govers (tho the disgrace of hun nature) have this advah the that they are sile; if the people suffer, they know the head frowhich their suffering springs, know likewise the redy, and are not bewildered by a variety of causes and cures.
but the stitution of england is so exceedingly plex, that the nation y suffer for years together without being able to dver in which part the fault lies; so will say in one and so in another, and every political physi will advise a different die.
i know it is difficult to get over local or long standing prejudices, yet if we will suffer ourselves to exahe po parts of the english stitution, we shall find theto be the base reins of two ayrannies, pounded with so new republi terials.
first - the reins of narchial tyranny in the person of th&a;a;lt;cite&a;a;gt;?99lib?&a;a;lt;/cite&a;a;gt;e king.
sedly - the reins of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the peers.
thirdly - the new republi terials in the persons of the ons, on whose virtue depends the freedoof england.
the two first, by being hereditary, are indepe of the people; wherefore in a stitutional sehey tribute nothing towards the freedoof the state.
to say that the stitution of england is a union of three powers reciprocally cheg each other, is farcical, either the words have no aning, or they are flat tradis.
to say that the ons is a check upon the king, presupposes two things:first - that the king is not to be trusted without being looked after, or in other words, that a thirst for absolute power is the natural disease of narchy.
sedly - that the ons, by being appointed for that purpose, are either wiser or re worthy of fidehan the .
but as the sa stitution which gives the ons a power to check the king by withholding the supplies, gives afterwards the king a power to check the ons, by e hito reject their other bills; it again supposes that the king is wiser than those whoit has already supposed to be wiser than hia re absurdity!there is sothing exceedingly ridiculous in the position of narchy; it first excludes a n frothe ans of infortio eowers hito a cases where the highest judgnt is required.the state of a king shuts hifrothe world, yet the business of a king requires hito know it thhly; wherefore the different parts, by unnaturally opposing aroying each other, prove the whole character to be absurd and useless.
so writers have explaihe english stitution thus: the king, say they, is ohe people ahe peers are a house in behalf of the king, the ons in behalf of the people; but this hath all the distins of a house divided against itself; and though the expressions be pleasantly arranged, yet when exahey appear idle and aiguous; and it will always happen, that thestru that words are capable of, when applied to the description of so thing which either ot exist, or is too inprehensible to be within the pass of description, will be words of sound only, and though they y ase the ear, they ot inforthe nd, for this explanation includes a previous question, viz.
how came the king by a power which the people are afraid to trust, and always obliged to chebsp; such a poweuld not be the gift of a wise people, herany power, whieeds cheg, be frogod; yet the provision, which the stitution kes, supposes such a power to exist.
but the provision is unequal to the task; the aher ot or will not aplish the end, and the whole affair is a felo de se; for as the greater weight will always carry up the less, and as all the wheels of a e are put in tion by o only reins to know which power iitution has the st weight, for that will govern; and though the others, or a part of the y clog, or, as the phrase is, check the rapidity of its tio so long as they ot stop it, their endeavours will be iual; the first ving power will at last have its way, and what it wants in speed, is supplied by ti.
that theis this overbearing part in the english stitution, needs not be ntioned, and that it derives its whole sequence rely frobeing the giver of places and pensions, is self-evident, wherefore, though we have been wise enough to shut and lock a dainst absolute narchy, we at the sa ti have been foolish enough to put thein possession of the key.
the prejudice of englishn in favour of their own gover by king, lords, and ons, arises as ore fronational pride than reason.
individuals are undoubtedly safer in england than in so other tries, but the will of the king is as ch the law of the land in britain as in france, with this differehat instead of proceeding directly frohis uth, it is hao the people uhe re fordable shape of an act of parliant.for the fate of charles the first hath only de kings re subtle - not &a;a;lt;cite&a;a;gt;&a;a;lt;/cite&a;a;gt;re just.
wherefore, laying aside all national pride and prejudi favour of des and for, the plain truth is, that it is wholly owing to the stitution of the people, and not to the stitution of the gover, that theis not as oppressive in england as in turkey.
an inquiry into the stitutional errors in the english forof gover is at this ti highly necessary; for as we are never in a proper dition of doing justice to others, while we tinue uhe influence of so leading partiality, so her are able of doing it to ourselves while we reiered by any obstinate prejudice.
and as a n.who is attached to a prostitute, is unfitted to choose or judge a wife, so any prepossession in favour of a rotten stitution of gover will disable us frodising a good one.
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